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Isobenefit Lines can offer a certain range of applicability in Location Theory and 
Gravitational Models for Urban and Geography Economics, in positional decision 
processes made by citizens, and, last but not least, in land value and property market 
theories and analysis. The value of a land, or a property, in a generic k point, is, ceteris 
paribus, the mirror of the quality, attractiveness, benefit characterizing k. Preference Gap 
Gain (PGG) of a person, is the difference between his Personal Isobenefit Lines and that of 
the majority of people. In monetary terms, when buying or renting a property, it can 
become an economic gain or vice versa, and PGG localizes and quantifies this gain.   
 
 
 
 
1. Isobenefit Lines definition 
 
The Isobenefit Lines (D’Acci 2006, 2007, 2009a,b, 2012a,b,c,d), join the urban points with a same level of 
benefit given from urban amenities. Considering amenities the urban attractions such as parks, pedestrian 
streets, nice squares, pleasant shopping areas, etc.  
The benefit of a generic point (k) in the city received from a generic amenity i with a level A of 
attractiveness, is given by (D’Acci 2009a,b, 2012a,b,c,d): 
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Where E is a coefficient of “Efficiency of moving” that depends from the cost/comfort/speed of reaching the 
amenity. Fig. 1 shows the result of equation 1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Example of Spatial Benefit (right) from an amenity (left) 
 
 
E should not be too high (Fig. 2), because it is suggested a function shape where the gradient of the benefit, 
against the distance, varies significantly (like a parabolic or hyperbolic shape). If not, following the equation 
1, a point between two amenities could result with a analogous benefit than a point in front of one of the two 
amenities. 
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Fig. 2 Examples of different values of the Moving Efficiency coefficient (E) with Ai=3 by equation 1 
 
 
We could also choose other kinds of function shapes (Fig. 3) such as (Mossello 1990): 
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Fig. 3 Example of Gaussian relation between accessibility and distance 
 
 
Or (Fig. 4), by deleting the squared in equation 2 (similarly to Wu & Plantinga , 2003, however with other 
meaning and in other contexts):  
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Fig. 4 Example of exponential relation between accessibility and distance 
 
 
We can also refer to concepts and models well-known in geography such as “Accessibility Potential” and 
Gravitational Models, or to prior methods developed by location theorists (Malthus, von Thünen, Christaller, 
Losh, Alonso, Muth, Mills, Smith, Isard, Moses, Hotelling…), the weberian Isocost Lines and their derivate 
concept of Isodapanes (Geertman and Van Eck, J. R., 1995), etc. 
Independently from the equation chosen, the Isobenefit Lines are the lines that join the urban points with the 
same level of B (Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 5 Isobenefit Lines 
 
For the ‘non-attractiveness’ of the city (busy streets, abandoned factories, cemetery, etc.), we  introduce an A 
with a negative value (Fig. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 6 ‘Non-attractiveness’ 
 
Taking into account the entire attractions present in a city, the benefit of the k urban point is the sum of the 
benefit given by each attraction in the city, and it depends on the distance, level, number and reciprocal 
positions of attractions: 
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to quantify the uniformity of the spatial distribution of the attractions effects on the city, by the Isobenefit 
Lines, we can use the following indicator (the Uniformity Coefficient, D’Acci 2012a,b,c,d, 2009a,b): 
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U is a number less or equal to 1 (maximum uniformity of the benefit effect). We should separately consider 
amenities (A>0), and disamenities (A<0), in order to quantify U. 
 
2. Variety Value and Proximity Value 
 
U is 1 minus the variation coefficient (namely the ratio between standard deviation and mean) of the benefit 
of each urban point. It does not quantify the uniformity of the amenities location throughout the city, but the 
uniformity of the positional advantage of each urban point. If we compare different scenarios, U should be 
read together with other indicators such as the total, medium, maximum and minimum value of B. For 
example, we imagine a radiocentric city with all its attractions distributed on the external circular crown 
(scenario 1), or throughout all the city area (scenario 2). It could (depending on E) even result U1>U2. 
However, we will notice that the level of B is higher in each point in scenario 2 rather than in 1. U could 
result higher in 1 than in 2 because the central part has always a positional advantage due to its geometrical 
position, even if it does not have any amenity in front of it (scenario 1). In scenario 1, it has an advantage of 
“variety”; it can get all the amenities with the same effort (distance). If we put amenities uniformly covering 
all the city area (scenario 2), the positional advantage of the centre becomes even higher in comparison with 
the periphery (U1>U2). In equations 2, 5 and subsequent, the higher E, the higher this distortion of the 
lecture of U (and B) could be. For this are suggested low values of E.  
The higher E the more the equation ‘weighs’ the ‘variety’ advantage to enjoy numerous amenities, rather 
than the advantage of the proximity of one amenity. I defines the first advantage as Variety Value, the second 
as Proximity Value. 
 
3. Breaking point of equal attraction 
 
Huff (1963) provides the probability (P) of a customer (C) living in a place (i), to travel to a particular 
facility (j) distant dij, considering all the other n facilities available: 
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By substituting facility with amenity – urban attractions –  and customer with citizen, equation 6 can easily 
be read in another point of view. The same can be done for several gravitational models available. For 
example, the Isobenefit lines can offer a comparison with the Breaking point of Reill’s law of Retail 
Gravitation (1931).  It describes the breaking point of the boundary of equal attraction. Reading Reill’s 
equation from the point of view of urban amenities: 
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Where Br is the breaking point between the urban amenity 1 and 2, d1,2 is their reciprocal distance, and A 
their attractiveness. This can be compared with the point, Br, showed by the Isobenefit lines (from equation 
1, 4) in Fig. 7: the minimum value of benefit between the two amenities. It is the point at which a marble 
placed in the Isobenefit surface settles. 
The breaking point can be personal: one can prefer a closest amenity even if less attractive. Change of 
preference also happens for a same person at a different stage/age of his life.  
 
 
Fig. 7 Example of breaking points 
 
 
4. Personal Isobenefit Lines 
 
We can also build Personal Isobenefit Lines matching the preferences of each citizen. Isobenefit Lines, can 
vary among people, and ages. For example, one could prefer the variety offered from the availability to 
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access more than one amenity (and with a greater level of attractiveness), even paying the cost of not 
enjoying living very close to any amenity (although with a low attractiveness).  
If we build Personal Isobenefit Lines, E will also be influenced by the personal propensity to move, or the 
personal preference for the Variety Value (directly proportional to E in eq. 1, 4) rather than for the Proximity 
Value (inversely proportional to E). 
Isobenefit Lines can also be personalized because each person can feel different levels of attractiveness (A in 
equation 1, 4) for a same amenity. 
We should numerically judge how much an attraction can satisfy its pretension to be an ‘Attraction’ for the 
majority of citizens. It could be sensible to judge A by referring to the usual, average number of citizens (not 
tourists) using the attraction and by then comparing each amenity with the best place/s in the city and with 
the neutral ones. In a similar way, but in different contest and aim, urban economists have often been 
interested in using population levels as a measure of urban success. High levels of population “tell us that 
people are voting with their feet to move to a particular place” (Glaeser 2008). There is no doubt about the 
relativity, and then the validity, of our own preferences also if divergent from other people, or even from the 
average peoples preferences: that which for a person can be a wonderful attraction, i.e. a shopping mall, for 
another can be a boring, consumerist place. Idem for the judgment of amenities such as parks, historical 
areas, and so forth. 
 
5. Preference Gap Gain: Property value as spatial benefit mirror 
 
If, ceteris paribus, the average price of properties in two different urban areas of the city (D’Acci 2012e), are 
the same, it seems that citizens (customers) showed to appreciate both areas in the same way; or that a part of 
them preferred one area, and the other part the other area, but both in the same way. 
If, ceteris paribus, the average price of properties in two different urban areas are different, those prices are 
usually expected to reflect the preference/needs expressed by citizens.  
This is valid as long as there is an adequate volume of trade of houses in the areas. In fact, to fix a price, it is 
enough that there is one person (not the majority) willing to pay that price. However this also depends from 
the time that the seller is willing to wait for selling, and from the ratio between the number of sellers and 
buyers from that kind of property/land.  
Comparing the offer price, that everybody can see in any real estate agency website, of a similar 
land/property but in different places such as a nice city centre, an unattractive peripherical area, a touristical 
mountain locality, a countryside area without services or comfortable streets, etc., we could notice 
differences. Those differences reflect in part the preferences/needs shown from people and their 
costs/advantages by living there, i.e. commuting, amenities, average income/job offer in the area, etc.  
That citizen whose preference diverges from the average preference/needs, when buying or renting a 
property, could have an economical advantage, or a disadvantage depending on the direction of the 
divergence. 
I call Preference Gap Gain (PGG) this advantage/disadvantage. Advantage, i.e, is when one prefers an area 
in which usually nobody would like to live (a quite inaccessible point, distant from any services, centralities, 
non touristic, etc.); disadvantage is when this person is obligated (for some reason), to live in an area that he 
does not like but that everyone loves. In the first case he could pays less for something which for him has a 
great value, vice versa in the second case. This is the well-known surplus of the customer (Dupuit 1844, 
Marshall 1890). 
Those examples are valid if we consider the income and the commuting cost as a constant and not depending 
from the area in which the citizen chose/must live. Income in big and/or expansive cities is usually higher 
than in small/cheap cities, and this is compensated (spatial equilibrium) from the higher housing costs, 
general living costs and/or some disadvantage (Glaeser 2008). Therefore the examples mentioned can refer 
to citizens choosing a place inside a same city (that means having the same job), or across cities/places 
(countryside, cities, villages…) if their job does not change by moving and does not require commuting 
change (i.e. independent worker, such as a writer, web designer working online, etcetera). 
Under those conditions, PGG of the person x, can be visualized/measured by overlapping/subtracting the 
Isobenefit Lines of x and the Isobenefit Lines of the majority of people. 
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